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Introduction
The US$120m. Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralisation (CMIM) was 
launched on 24th March 2010 to fund any short-term liquidity crisis amongst 
the 13 East and South East Asian countries that comprise the ASEAN+3 
group.1  At the time of its launch the CMIM was widely reported, particu-
larly in Asia, as heralding the establishment of an AMF (Asian Monetary 
Fund) that would provide an independent alternative to the IMF and 
distance from the influence of the USA.2. However, while the CMIM may 
well be a major step towards the establishment of  such an AMF, as pres-
ently constituted it is neither  separate from the IMF nor fully functional. 
At this stage in its development the CMIM can only provide very limited
short-term funding to members without referral to the IMF. 3 Thus, the 
CMIM should be seen as supplementing and generally supporting the cur-
rent international financial governance structure rather than providing any 
immediate challenge to it. Indeed, the supplementary, even subservient 
relationship of the CMIM with the IMF was stressed in the ASEAN+3 public 
statements.4 As is discussed in this paper, this would appear to be a remark-
ably contradictory position given that the original motivation for establishing 
the CMIM was to provide an alternative to the IMF, and the generally low 
regard with which the Fund is held in East and South East Asia. Indeed, 
given the stigma still attached to the IMF in the Asian media and population, 
it can be argued that the linking of the CMIM to the IMF may well make it 
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inoperable for most, if not all, of the mem-
bers that are likely to be in need of funding. 
However, as is outlined in this paper, it is 
also the case that  this contradiction has been 
embedded in the whole post-1997 develop-
ment of Asian regional financial structures. 
This in turn reflects the complex interaction 
of regional and global power structures and 
the manner in which these  have been dealt 
with at each stage of the developments and 
negotiations that have led to the CMIM.5  
While it might have been expected that  
embedded contradictions would have lead 
to the project becoming permanently stalled, 
this has not been the case. As is discussed 
below, progress towards the establishment  of 
a fully functional Asian fund has continued, 
conditioned by the fears and actual threats 
of another major crisis affecting the region. 
This continuation has involved careful navi-
gating around the central issue of the link 
with the IMF while progressing those issues 
that  could be  agreed. In this way there has 
been a gradual establishment of the  struc-
tures,  institutions, and practices that would 
facilitate the full operation of the regional 
funds. Under the crisis conditions that have 
prevailed since 2007, there has been signifi-
cant progress in these areas. However, this 
still begs the question of when, or indeed if, 
the critical decision will be made that will 
enable the CMIM to become fully functional.
Motivations for the 
establishment of the CMIM
The process that led to the CMIM has to 
understood in the context of the form that 
regional integration in East and South East 
Asia has taken, and the shock and reaction 
associated with the 1997 financial crisis (Gills 
et al 2007: 87). This revealed the fatal weakness 
of a high level of regional integration driven 
by trade, investment, production networks 
and significant liberalisation with very lim-
ited institutional structure (Urata 2001: 453).6 
Under conditions of such informal region-
alisation there was little to prevent the rapid 
financial contagion which characterised the 
events of 1997-8. This realisation has been a 
major factor in the broad promotion of more 
formal approaches to Asian economic integra-
tion (Beeson 2009). Indeed, Dieter (2007: 4)
sees the 1997 crisis as the most important 
factor in the development of Asian region-
alism. As a direct result of the crisis the 
ASEAN regional project was significantly 
revitalised and extended to East Asia with 
the establishment of ASEAN+3,7 which was 
to become the principle body driving formal 
regionalisation and articulating the need for 
some form of East-South East Asian com-
munity (Bird and Rajan 2002: 4; Kawai 2009: 
20).8 The initial focus in the wake of the 
crisis was on macroeconomic and financial 
stability. This led to the rapid emergence  
of a general consensus amongst the major 
East and South East Asian economies on the 
need for regional financial structures and 
governance. These would  provide monitor-
ing, prevention, mitigation and safely net 
functions, while ensuring greater independ-
ence from Western money markets, and the 
Bretton Woods System (Dieter, 2007: 5).9 The
consensus was further reinforced by fears of
another crisis, a general feeling of having been
badly let-down by the IMF and the USA, and
denied any alternative by their vetoing of 
attempts to establish an AMF in 1997.10 
As a direct result of its handling of the 
crisis the IMF lost considerable credibility, 
particularly in Asia. This stemmed from the 
failure to anticipate the crisis, a misreading 
of its nature, the imposition of inappropriate 
deflationary policies and insistence on the 
closure of large numbers of financial institu-
tions, measures which undoubtedly deepened 
and prolonged the crisis (Bullard 2002: 147-
153; Weisbrot 2007: 3-4). These issues being 
reinforced by the manner in which govern-
ments were made responsible for the private 
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sector debts, and demands for rapid reform 
and liberalisation, particularly of foreign 
ownership regulations (Bullard 2002; Dash 
2003). Overall, there was widespread resent-
ment of the manner in which Asian systems 
of regulation and interrelations between 
business, state and banks were both blamed 
for the crisis and ear-marked for dismantling 
(Weisbrot 2007: 2-3). The experience of 1997 
showed just how far IMF policy conflicted 
with the various Asian developmental forms. 
In addition, for many in Asia, the IMF was 
seen as acting as both debt collector for the 
Western banks and an agent of Wall Street, 
which has long sought the removal of restric-
tions on foreign ownership11. Quite simply the 
IMF was seen as not serving Asian interests.
While the IMF has admitted that it mis-
handled the crisis (Weisbrot 2007: 4), this 
has done little to rehabilitate the Fund in the 
eyes of Asian policy makers, business lead-
ers, and large sections of the population and 
media. Indeed, it can be argued that, at the 
core of the motivation of the East and South 
East Asian countries moves towards the 
establishment of regional financial structures 
is a firmly rooted aversion to ever again 
having to surrender economic sovereignty 
to the IMF (Higgott 1998; Weisbrot 2007: 5). 
That the above views were a source of 
concern for the USA and the IMF is reflected 
in their establishment late in 1997 of the MFG 
(Manila Framework Group). This body, which 
also involved the Asian Development Bank 
and the World Bank, was intended to coor-
dinate the development of a framework for 
Asian regional cooperation to ensure financial 
stability. However, this was envisaged as 
supplementing and supporting the IMF rather 
than offering a real alternative for the Asian 
economies. That is, diverting the ASEAN+3 
from moves that would lead to the estab-
lishment of any fully independent regional 
monetary fund. However, this did not pre-
vent renewed calls for the establishment of 
such a body, notably at a meeting of ASEAN 
finance minsters in Manila during 1999.
More significant than the activities of the 
MFG12 was a sharp change in IMF policy 
during 2000 in the direction of openly sup-
porting the establishment of formal  regional 
monetary funds, but only as long as they 
did not compete with the Fund (see Bird and 
Rajan 2002: 39; Kohler 2001; Park 2001: 
6). For the IMF the bottom line was in the 
event of any application for financial assist-
ance, a regional fund would defer to the 
IMF which would direct any macro eco-
nomic policy that it deemed necessary.
While the activities of the IMF and USA do 
not seem to have had any immediate impact 
on the general ASEAN+3 view of  the need 
for regional financial governance and  disre-
gard for the IMF, these positions have come 
to be variously compromised and confused.
Antecedents of the CMIM
In the wake of the 1997 crisis there was 
rapid progress in the development of a range 
of regional structures, agreements and  the 
institutionalisation of regular meetings, 
exchanges of information and views, and 
co-operation between the region’s central 
bankers and finance ministries, something 
that did not happen before the 1997 cri-
sis. Initially, developments focused on the 
ASEAN members, extending to the East 
Asian group following the institutionalisa-
tion of ASEAN+3 in 1999. Key moves during 
1997-9 included: the ASEAN Surveillance 
Process (ASP)13, managed by the ASEAN 
Coordination Unit (ASCU); the Regional 
Economic Monitoring Unit (REMU); and, 
most importantly, the development of 
the ASA (Asian Swap Agreement). 
The ASA, which dated from 1977, involved 
an agreement between Indonesia, Malay-
sia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand 
to provide short-term liquidity through a 
series of BSAs (Bilateral Swap Agreements).14 
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However, the amount available (US$200m.) 
was too limited to be even worth activating 
given the scale of the 1997 crisis and the ASA 
went largely unnoticed by most commenta-
tors. However, the agreement was renewed 
during 1997 and in March 2000 extended to 
include all the members of ASEAN, the fund 
being increased to US$1bn. The expansion 
was accompanied by discussions over the 
participation of the China, Japan and South 
Korea. In May 2000 these developments were 
brought together in the CMI (Chiang Mai 
Initiative) which involved all 13 members of 
the ASEAN+3. This attracted much comment 
as the first regional financial body, a road 
map for regional monetary integration and a 
precursor of an AMF (He Fan et al 2010: 1). 
The inclusion of China, Japan and South 
Korea led to a rapid expansion of available 
funding. By the end of 2003 the East Asian 
members had agreed 16 new BSAs, involving 
US$45bn. Further development of these agree-
ments raised the funding to US$78bn. by 2008 
and US$90bn. by 2009. In addition, the earlier 
ASA fund was in 2005 increased to US$2.0bn.
Impressive as these sums were, there 
were still concerns that they might prove 
inadequate in the event of a major crisis.15 
Much more significantly, there was a real 
possibility that the CMI would be rendered 
ineffective by being formally linked with the 
IMF.16 Under this arrangement a member 
could only draw 10% of the funding agreed 
under their various BSAs (raised to 20% 
in 2005), without the approval  of the IMF 
which might involve entering a Fund sta-
bilisation or adjustment programme. While 
referral to the IMF clearly followed the USA 
and IMF agendas, within ASEAN+3 it was 
extremely contentious and highly divisive. 
The IMF link appears to have been sup-
ported by the likely major creditor members, 
China and Japan (Kawai 2009). Their view, 
with the events of 1997-8 still fresh, appears 
to have been that the involvement of the IMF 
was necessary to ensure that CMI members 
who received funding made any adjustments 
necessary to ensure the return to financial 
stability and avoid moral hazard. That is, 
the IMF link provided conditionality for the 
regional lenders without them having to take 
any responsibility which might have signifi-
cant implications for intra-regional relations. 
Something that was doubly attractive given 
the lack of the experience or institutional 
capacity to construct and oversee adjustment 
programmes, and concerns over enforcement, 
not least because of a reluctance to become 
involved in the internal affairs of members - a 
basic principle of ASEAN (Eichengreen 2009).
In contrast, the link to the IMF was strongly 
opposed by Malaysia, which during 1997-8 
had very firmly rejected IMF assistance and, 
even more, advice (Kawai 2009). However, 
other likely borrowers, notably Indonesia, 
Thailand, The Philippines and South Korea, 
who were at least as opposed to the IMF as 
Malaysia, were rather muted in their opposi-
tion. This would seem to reflect their having 
accepted IMF funding in 1997-8 and still being 
within their respective programmes. Thus, 
they may well have felt that they were not 
in a position to vigorously oppose the link. 
A position further influenced by concern 
over the impact of opposition on their rela-
tions with the USA at a time when they felt 
economically and politically vulnerable. 
The CMI was clearly intended to support 
and supplement the IMF rather than chal-
lenge it. Though it could be argued that by 
its existence the CMI ‘constituted a credible 
threat of exit from the IMF on the part of the 
ASEAN+3, which could be used as lever-
age to ensure favourable treatment by the 
Fund  if a CMI member were in need of a 
‘bailout’ (Grimes 2011: 87, citing Saori Katad 
2004). It could be also be argued that the CMI 
was of considerable symbolic importance to 
ASEAN+3 and its regional project as whole. 
Additionally, the CMI  agreement reflected 
well on the ability of the members, many of 
which had a history of very uneasy relations, 
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to negotiate a complex and contentious issue. 
A less positive view would be that the CMI 
illustrated the manner in which ASEAN+3 
could arrive at face saving agreements 
which glossed over fundamental contradic-
tions and postponed difficult decisions.  
Despite the problematic nature of the CMI 
agreement it was followed by a further wave 
of developments. Notably, the proliferation 
of regional  surveillance and related manage-
ment bodies and their extension to cover 
ASEAN + 3.17 Particularly important were: 
the 2001 agreement of the ASEAN+3 finance 
ministers on monitoring short-term capital 
movements by exchanging information on 
cross-border flows; and the 2002 establish-
ment of the ERPR (Economic Review and 
Policy Dialogue) to exchange information 
on economic conditions and policy issues.18 
However, significant as these developments 
were, there was limited progress on the 
wider issues of financial integration, such 
as exchange rate alignment and bond and 
equity markets (Fung et al 2008: 5-6; Garcia-
Herreo et al 2008: 38). The slow progress in 
these areas reflected a lessening of urgency 
in the context of economic recovery, increas-
ing regional friction, and continuing lack of 
agreement over the exact form that integration 
would take. In addition to the central issue 
of links with the IMF, there were significant 
differences of opinion over management, 
operation, monitoring, overall control and 
voting rights (Dieter 2007: 19). However, these 
issues were to be brought into sharp relief 
by the breaking of the current crisis in 2007 
which provided the first real test of the CMI. 
The CMI and the crisis
Following the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers, Indonesia, Singapore and South 
Korea experienced serious liquidity short-
ages. These occurred despite significant 
foreign reserves19 and reflected the way 
in which during the latter part of 2008 the 
rapid liquidising of assets in such emer-
gent markets created a major shortage of 
US dollars (Sussangkarn 2010a: 13). 
While South Korea could have drawn 
US$18.5bn through the CMI and a further 
US$4.5bn. through related (but formally 
separated) bilateral arrangements with the 
Bank of Japan and the Peoples Bank of China, 
it choose not to do so. Instead, US$30bn. was 
secured through a currency swap with the 
US Federal Reserve.  As Kawai (2009: 8) has 
noted, this was a very direct result of the 
linking of the CMI to the IMF, which meant 
that only US$3.5bn. (plus the US$4.5bn. from 
the separate bilateral arrangements) was 
available without referral to the Fund. This 
was clearly insufficient to address the liquid-
ity problem and, given the bitter memories 
of 1997-8, recourse to the IMF would have 
posed a serious domestic political problem 
for the government (Kawai 2009: 8). Indeed, 
some commentators went further describing 
recourse to the IMF as ‘political suicide’ for 
the Korea government (Sussangkan 2010b). 
It is instructive that both Singapore and 
Indonesia when faced with similar short-term 
liquidity problems also declined to utilise 
CMI funding and sought swap arrangements 
with the Federal Reserve (Sussangkan 2010a: 
13). In the event,  Singapore was granted the 
same facility as South Korea (US$30bn.), but 
Indonesia was refused and instead was able 
to extend its non-CMI bilateral agreements 
with the Bank of Japan to US$12.9bn. and with 
the Peoples Bank of China to US$14.6bn. 
Thus, while recourse to the IMF was 
avoided by all three countries, the link to the 
Fund rendered the CMI safety net unusable 
for South Korea, and was almost certainly 
a factor in the decisions of Singapore and, 
more particularly, Indonesia. It seems likely 
that other members, most notably Thailand, 
would have had similar difficulties with 
referral of funding requests to the IMF. 
It could be argued that the bilateral 
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arrangements that Indonesia drew on were 
developed as part of the process that led to 
the CMI and demonstrated both the avail-
ability of the necessary funds within Asia and 
the willingness of China and Japan to assist 
a member of the CMI. However, this does 
beg the question of the function of the CMI. 
There is also the issue of extent to which the 
type of ad hoc arrangements that Indonesia, 
Singapore and South Korea resorted to, is 
likely to involve the types of political levers 
and obligations that the CMI might have been 
expected to avoid. While borrowers might be 
able to gain through playing off China, Japan 
and the USA, they could also find themselves 
uncomfortably obligated to and / or alien-
ated from one or more of these key players. 
Similarly, while the lenders would potentially 
be in a powerful position they would be 
faced with the regional political consequences 
of granting or not the requested funding. 
Exactly the position that China and Japan 
sought to avoid by favouring the IMF link.
The CMIM
The events of 2007-8 brought a new 
urgency to the development of an Asian 
regional financial structure. This reflected 
the  concerns over the impact on the Asian 
economies, the seeming marginalisation 
of the IMF in the face of the scale of the 
crisis, and the general failure of the G20 
meetings to make any progress in reform-
ing global financial governance. However, 
it is far from clear what influence, if any, 
the failure of members to utilise the CMI 
during 2008 had on developments.
Intensive negotiations during 2008 and 
early 2009 lead to the expansion of the 
currency swap facility and in May 2009 
agreement was reached20 over converting 
the bilateral arrangements into an US$80bn. 
multilateral fund, and the establishment 
of AMRO (ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic 
Research Office) to improve regional 
surveillance. At the February 22-23 meet-
ing of finance ministers held in Thailand, 
the fund was extended to US$120bn.
However, there was no clear resolution 
of the contentious issue of linkages with the 
IMF. It was agreed that the ASA 20% delinked 
portion principle would apply to the new 
body, but only until a credible regional sur-
veillance body was established. However, this 
represented a major face saving ‘fudge’, for  
while the central importance of AMRO was 
stressed, at no point was the question of  how 
the adequacy of the surveillance mechanisms 
might be judged. In addition, it was by no 
means clear what would happen in the event 
of the mechanisms being considered ‘cred-
ible’. Thus, the Joint Ministerial Statement 
that heralded the final agreement stated:21
The regional surveillance mechanism should 
be further strengthened into a robust and 
credible system which will facilitate prompt 
activation of the CMIM. An independent 
regional surveillance unit will be established 
to promote objective economic monitoring. 
After the above surveillance mechanism 
becomes fully effective in its function, the IMF 
de-linked portion may be increased above the 
current limit of 20 percent [emphasis added]. 
Surprisingly, this vague commitment appears 
to have been sufficient to enable the sign-
ing of the CMIM in December 2009. Yet, as 
many commentators have stressed, includ-
ing the Asian Development Bank, unless 
the CMIM is formally separated from the 
fund, it will remain essentially inoperable 
(Asian Development Bank 2009; Kawai 2009: 
8).22  Thus, the agreement has  left the CMIM 
as essentially ‘work in progress’, with, in 
terms of operability, no clear advance on 
the CMI.  There was still  no viable  alter-
native to the IMF except the  sort of ad hoc 
arrangements  resorted to in 2008-9 with their 
attendant potentially problematic political 
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consequences.23 Though, as with the CMI, 
the new body can be seen has providing both 
an important symbol of the progress of the 
wider Asian regional project and a possible 
lever in any negotiations with the IMF.
To be fair to the agreement reached over 
the CMIM and the IMF link, it is clear that 
substantial work needed to be done on 
the issues of surveillance, monitoring and 
exchanges of information between cen-
tral banks and finance ministries, which 
remain far from comprehensive or coor-
dinated (Asian Development Bank 2009). 
In addition, there were concerns about the 
adequacy of the CMIM fund and individual 
quotas (Table 1; Sussangkorn 2010b). 
Following the  signing of the CMIM agree-
ment  progress slowed. As in the period before 
2007, the urgency  drained from the regional 
financial project in the wake of the recovery 
of the Asian economies and the retreat of the 
immediate threat of any 1930s-style global 
depression. This general lessening  of urgency  
and consensus  was evident in the protracted 
negotiations over the  location of AMRO, its 
starting date  and the appointment of its first 
director. While  agreement over an initial 
location in Singapore and a May 2011 start-
ing date were reached  by the end of 2010, 
the  question of the nationality of the director 
proved far more contentious. This became a 
straight conflict between China and Japan,  
which was much reported in the Asian media 
(with Japan billed as the favourite), but almost 
completely ignored in the West. The result, 
announced at the 14th meeting of ASEAN+3 
Finance Ministers held in Hanoi in early May, 
was a typical face saving compromise. The 
Chinese candidate Wei Benhua would be 
the first director but would serve less than 
half of the three year term, stepping down 
in favour of the Japanese Yoichi Nemoto. 
The agreement over AMRO was accompa-
nied by further moves that suggest renewed 
urgency has been engendered by the deepen-
ing Eurozone crisis and mounting concerns 
over the US economy and debt levels. Most 
attention has focused on a doubling of the 
CMIM fund to US$240bn. with a further 
provision to increase the amount to what ever 
might prove necessary (Rathus 2011).24 Impor-
tant as this is, perhaps more significantly, 
China suggested that the delinked proportion 
should be increased to 30-40%. While this was 
not agreed, China indicated that  it was now 
moving to favour a break from the IMF and  
was beginning  to see this as priority (Rathus 
2011).  Given  China’s initial directorship of 
AMRO, this could be an extremely important 
development that might  not only accelerate 
the development of the support structure for  
the CMIM, but, more importantly, provide a 
possible gradual route to partial, if not full 
functionality for the fund. However,  as ever 
this would  be conditioned, perhaps,  even 
negated, by regional and global economic 
conditions and political considerations.
Conclusion
The CMIM  is the latest stage in the devel-
opment of a regional financial project that 
originated in crisis, and has been driven by its 
memory and the fears and threats of further 
crises. At each stage the central objective of 
establishing an Asian means of dealing with 
financial crises separate from the IMF and 
the West has been compromised by relations 
between the Asian states and wider geopoliti-
cal considerations. This led to agreements 
that despite containing contradictions that 
made the CMI and  the CMIM inoperable,  
continue to carry the project forward. While 
this does appear to be a case of ignoring the 
elephant in the room,  it seems unlikely that 
the countries involved  would have expended 
so much time and effort on the project if they 
did not continue to believe  that  establishing 
a  function regional fund  was both necessary 
and feasible. In addition, there seems to be 
continued confidence in the  gradual, face 
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saving,  compromising and highly pragmatic  
‘ASEAN way’ of  negotiating through, and 
navigating around, seemly irreconcilable 
contradictions and divisions. However,  even 
if one accepts the continuing confidence of 
CMIM members in both the validity of the 
project and the means of achieving it, it is 
clear that changing regional and global cir-
cumstances are causing the decision making 
environment to be significantly more complex.
On the one hand there are rising concerns 
over China’s increasingly assertive  regional 
policy and expanding military capacity, and 
the need to balance this  by promoting the 
US’s regional presence.25 On the other hand, 
there seems to be no viable alternative for 
CMIM members to be deeper involved in a 
region in which both growth and integration 
are increasingly driven by China. However, 
events since 2007 have also underlined the 
lessons of 1997: a highly integrated open 
regional system needs effective institutional 
structures, particularly with respect to finance. 
Under present global circumstances, despite 
the rapid Asian recovery, the need would 
seem to be greater rather than less. This not 
least for China and Japan in their roles as 
centres of the increasingly important and 
complex regional production systems and the 
interface between these and the rest of the 
global economy (Athukorala 2009).26 Financial 
instability in any of the key members of the 
production system could, even in the absence 
of direct financial contagion, have serious 
consequences for both Japan and China. 
Given the above, and the general state of 
the global economy, even in the absence  of  
a decision over the IMF link, there would 
appear to be considerable incentives for 
both China and Japan to push for the rapid 
establishment of effective  regional-based 
monitoring,  surveillance, macro analysis, 
policy coordinating and support institutions 
through AMRO. However, this would rest 
on agreement over  priorities and approach 
which might be  not be easily achieved. As 
has already been  noted,  China  appears to 
have shifted towards the view that the prior-
ity is the separation of the CMIM from the 
IMF, while the Japanese position on  this issue  
remains less clear. At the May 2011 meeting of 
finance ministers, Japan opposed the Chinese 
proposal to increase the delinked portion of 
the CMIM, arguing that the priority was to 
establish effective regional monitoring, sur-
veillance and  macro analysis through AMRO, 
before the question of separation from the IMF 
can be addressed – which was  of course the  
key point in the original CMIM agreement 
(Rathus 2011). While the Japanese position 
can be seen as no more than a difference of 
opinion over sequencing, rather than a lone 
voice against separation from the IMF, there 
are concerns that this is part of a wider  dete-
rioration of relations between the two regional 
powers and moves on the part of Japan  to 
offset China’s increasingly powerful  regional 
position. Though caution should be exercised 
in judging the ability of China and Japan to 
cooperate on the basis of the incidence of high 
profile public ‘spats’ and exchanges. A point 
that is perhaps underlined by the compro-
mise that they reached over the directorship 
of CMIM.  However,  such qualifications 
notwithstanding, it should be stressed that 
Japan’s position is extremely complex.   
Japan, like the other CMIM members 
is increasingly closely linked with China 
through trade, investment and production 
systems.   A situation that is  perhaps set 
to intensify in the wake of the March 2011 
tsunami, as Japan off-shores  more high-tech 
activity to China  (Dixon 2011).  Thus Japan, 
perhaps more than any other CMIM member,  
may be expected to wish to balance  eco-
nomic  dependence on China  by reinforcing  
long-term security relations with the USA.27 
While it is not clear how the USA  would  
now regard a  Japanese centred  regional 
financial body independent from the IMF, 
it  would clearly be far less approving of one 
that was increasingly influenced by China. 
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So it may be that  Japan, despite its role as 
the originator of the AMF project and deep 
interest in regional financial stability, is hav-
ing second thoughts about the whole project. 
However, if Japan is seen by other members 
of CMIM to be opposing China’ s prioritis-
ing  of delinking from the IMF,  this could 
create an extremely  uncomfortable  position 
that  could compromise credibility in Asia 
while attracting the approval of Washington. 
There is here a much wider issue of Japan’s 
ability to continue its longstanding regional 
and global position as part of Asia and a 
bridge to the West. It may be that the time is 
approaching when Japan will have to choose 
where its priorities lie. In this, the critical 
issues will be the nature of the USA’s ongoing 
involvement in Asia as whole, and  relations 
with China in particular; which in turn raises 
the issues of  the  whole nature and govern-
ance of the  Asian region,  its  place in the 
global system and relations with the West.
Given the complexity of the  geopoliti-
cal  situation and the general history of the 
AMF project, it seems most likely that any 
moves toward a fully functioning regional 
fund will involve both a major crisis and / or 
rupture in regional and global systems, and  
complex, face saving agreements.  The latter 
might be facilitated by the further relaxing 
of the IMF position on regional bodies and, 
more importantly, the introduction of the 
FCL (Flexible Credit Line) and provision to 
forego conditionality for short-term problems 
in economies that it considers to be sound 
and have any necessary adjustments in hand 
(IMF 2011). This in addition to implications 
for regional financial management of the 
increased role of the ASEAN+3 in global 
financial governance, notably in the IMF, 
G20, Financial Stability Board and the Basel 
Committee (Grimes 2011: 102). For some 
members of the CMIM this may soften views 
of the IMF and make the continuation of some 
form of  on-going link  more palatable and 
easier to sell on the domestic political front. 
Clearly, the CMIM must still be seen as 
very much work in progress.  Whether  the 
end result will be a fully functioning AMF 
independent from the IMF remains an open 
question.  It is certainly  the case that   the 
longer the current uncertainty over the  Euro-
zone and the American economy continues 
the  more likely  it is that the structures, 
procedures and capacity necessary for the 
effective operation of the CMIM will be 
rapidly established. However, this may well 
not make the decision over the IMF link any 
easier. Indeed, this is still most likely only to 
be taken in the context of a major crisis con-
fronting CMIM members. However, while 
perhaps making it more difficult to avoid in 
the absence of a major crisis confronting the 
CMIM members. Though while  a major crisis  
may be necessary to propel the CMIM into 
full operation, it could also lead to the project 
becoming stalled, perhaps permanently. 
Notes
1  ASEAN+3 comprises the ten members 
of the Association of South East Asian Nations 
(Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, 
Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, 
Vietnam) plus China, Japan and South Korea.
2  Indeed, as Grimes (2011: 93) has noted, 
from the media reports one could well believe 
that the AMF had already been established. 
3  Members can only draw 20% of their 
quotas (see Table 1) without the permission of the 
IMF. The funds   being  supplied for an initial three 
month period which can be renewed up to six 
times. However, the cost is high, 150 points above 
LIBOR and increasing by 50 points with each  
renewal, up to a maximum of 300 (Rillo 2010). 
4  See for example: ‘Joint Media state-
ment of the 13th ASEAN Finance Minister’s 
Meeting, Pattaya, Thailand, 9 April 2009, http://
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www.aseansec.org/22483.htm; Joint Media state-
ment of the 12th ASEAN plus Three Finance 
Minister’s Meeting, Bali, Indonesia, 3 May 
2009, http://www.aseansec.org/22536.htm
5  For a very full treatment of the 
pre-CMIM relationship between regional 
financial developments and power structures 
see in particular Grimes 2006 and 2009.
6  In 2009 intra-regional trade as 
a percentage of total trade value:
EU    67.0
East and South East Asia 59.0
NAFTA   45.0
Source: Calculated from the IMF International 
Financial Statistics, Washington, various years.
7  The first meeting of the group took 
place in the autumn of 1997 and the organi-
sation was institutionalised in 1999.
8  By 2001 there appeared to be general 
agreement over the need to establish some form 
of East-South East Asian Community, the estab-
lishment of such a body was suggested by the 
East Asian Vision Group whose wide ranging 
proposal was reviewed by the East Asian Study 
Group which reported to the ASEAN + 3 leaders 
(Kawai 2009; ADP 2009: 1). This study proposed a 
wide range of short and medium term measures 
and in 2004 the leaders of ASEAN + 3 agreed that 
the establishment of an East Asian Community 
was their long-term objective with ASEAN + 3 as 
the ‘main vehicle for the project’ (ADB 2009: 1). 
9  These and subsequent developments 
have also to be seen in the context of a wide range 
of national moves aimed at limiting the pos-
sibility of further crises an mitigate their impact. 
Key measures include: restrictions on short-term 
capital flows to reduce speculation and volatility; 
a move away from the ‘hard peg’ to the US dollar 
which had generally prevailed before the crisis; 
adoption of currency management to maintain 
competitiveness and export earnings; accumula-
tion of central bank reserves; bank rationalisation; 
reform of financial sector practice and regulation; 
and the promotion of domestic demand (see Dixon 
2009 and 2012 for more detailed discussions).
10  While the AMF proposal was by no means 
fully thought through and needed considerable 
refinement, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion 
that the USA did not want to loose the leverage 
that could be exerted through the IMF to force 
open the East Asia economies. It also seems 
likely that the USA might have been uneasy over 
the prospect of Japan advancing its independ-
ent leadership role in Asia (Higgott 1998) . 
11  As Wade and Veneroso (1998) have noted,  
in terms of the outcome for the Asian economies, 
there is no difference between the actions of the 
IMF being based on a conspiracy or a coinci-
dence of interests with those of Wall Street. 
12  It can be argued that the  MFG 
had little significant impact on regional 
financial developments, which lead to it 
being disbanded in 2004 (Liu 2004). 
13  The ASP relies on economic and 
financial information supplied by the ASEAN. 
central banks, rather than the IMF’s Arti-
cle IV fact finding mission approach.
14  However, while the ASA had 
been the subject of several ASEAN agree-
ments, it had never been utilised.
15  The 1997 IMF programmes for Indonesia, 
South Korea and Thailand amounted to US$120bn.
16  This would seem to have been an impor-
tant factor in the establishment of a series of BSAs 
that remained outside of the CMI and therefore 
not subject to referral to the IMF, for example 
those of Indonesia with Japan and China.
17  The ASP becoming the APTSP 
(ASEAN Plus Three Surveillance Process). 
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18  A very wide range of bodies have become 
involved in the surveillance process, for example: 
AFMM (ASEAN Finance Ministers Meeting), 
ASFOM (ASEAN Senior Finance Officers Meeting), 
ASTSU (ASEAN Surveillance Technical Support 
Unit), ACBF (ASEAN Central Bank Forum), and 
FMSU (Finance and Macroeconomic Surveillance 
Unit). For reviews of the operation of these bodies 
see: Anas and Atje 2005; Chang and Rajang 1999, 
2002; Das 2005: 244-245; Manzano 2001; Rajan 2000.
19  As of December 2008 the reserves were: 
Indonesia US$49bn.; Singapore US$174bn.; South 
Korea US$200bn. (IMF ‘International Financial 
Statistics Online’, http://www.imfstatistics.org/imf/). 
20  At a sideline meeting held dur-
ing the 7th ASEAM (Asia-Europe Meeting) 
in Beijing 24-25 October 2008.
21  Joint Media Statement ‘Action Plan 
to Restore Economic and Financial Stability 
of the Asian Region’, Report from the Finance 
Ministers of the ASEAN+3 to Heads of States/
Governments, Phuket, Thailand, 22 February 
2009 http://www.aseansec.org/22158.htm
22  This suggests a significant shift in the 
position of the Asian Development Bank com-
pared to  that exibited duirng its membership of 
the MFG. Indeed, the Asian Development Bank 
has come to advocate the expansion of the CMIM 
and the establishment of a fully functioning AMF 
that  would ‘co-exist with the IMF’  (2011: 62. 112).
23  It is of course tempting to speculate 
that more was agreed over the IMF link that 
has been made public, particularly since the 
full agreement has not been made available 
(Grimes 2011: 93). This would be consistent 
with the sort of informal agreements and under-
standings which have typified so much of 
the operation of ASEAN and ASEAN+3.
24  Such an open ended commitment  
reflects the extent of the ASEAN+3 central bank 
reserves - almost US$5.0tr. at the end of 2010.
25  During 2010 and, more specifi-
cally 2011, the USA appears to have started 
to capitalise on these concerns with moves 
to re-engage with Asia (see Clinton, 2011).
26  Given their position in the regional 
system, a crisis that originated in China 
or Japan would be even more of an issue 
for the rest of the CMIM members. 
27   This may well be reflected in the 2010-
11 moves by the USA to re-engage with Asia 
and a hardening of its approach to China. 
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